Interest Arbitration as Alternative Dispute Resolution: The History from 1919 to 2011 by Slater, Joseph
Interest Arbitration as Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The History from 1919 to 2011
Joseph Slater*
The following was presented as a part of the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution's February 2012 Symposium, "The Role of ADR
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I. INTRODUCTION
This conference presents an excellent opportunity to discuss an important
form of alternative dispute resolution: the use of what is called "interest
arbitration"-a process described in detail below-to resolve bargaining
impasses in public-sector labor relations. This process is used in many states
as an alternative to strikes. While interest arbitration has been a crucial part
of public-sector labor law and labor relations for decades, it has come under
increased scrutiny in the past year. Indeed, in the wave of laws passed in
2011 restricting the rights of public-sector unions to bargain collectively,1
interest arbitration was repeatedly attacked, and in several states it was
eliminated or restricted.2
This paper gives a historical overview of the development of interest
arbitration, discussing how and why it developed as it did. This development
was neither inevitable nor "natural" in that many other western democracies
generally allow public workers to strike.3 But policymakers in the U.S. have
a long tradition of deep antipathy to strikes by government employees. Even
today, barely over a dozen states permit any public employees to strike.4
* Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of
Law.
1 See Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J.
189, 203-12 (2012); Martin H Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor
Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) for
detailed descriptions of these new laws.
2 See infra Section IV.
3 County. Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles Cnty. Emps. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564,
569, n. 8, 699 P.2d 835, 838, n.8 (1985) ("Interestingly, the United States is virtually
alone among Western industrial nations in upholding a general prohibition of public
employee strikes. Most European countries have permitted them, with certain limitations,
for quite some time as has Canada.").
4 By the year 2000, while thirty-eight states allowed at least some of their public
employees to bargain collectively, only ten had statutes granting any public workers the
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Thus, the question is: why did U.S. law and policy develop the way it did?
This paper will trace the history through today, as 2011 saw new laws being
passed that removed both strike rights and rights to interest arbitration.
I believe that in order to understand 2011, we must start with 1919. Thus,
while this paper will trace developments up through the present, including
debates on Ohio's Senate Bill 5(SB-5), it starts with a seminal event in the
history of public-sector labor law that occurred almost a century ago: the
Boston Police Strike. It shows that this event had a profound and lasting
impact on how U.S. policymakers felt about dispute resolution in public-
sector labor law. The paper then turns to the first public-sector labor law
permitting collective bargaining-passed, ironically in view of recent events,
in Wisconsin in 1959-and describes how concerns about dispute resolution
were central to debates over that law. The paper continues by explaining how
interest arbitration in public-sector labor relations has evolved and how it has
worked from the 1960s into the 21st century. Finally, the paper explores the
very recent developments in this area in the laws of 2011.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPASSE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
A. The Boston Police Strike and Antipathy to Strikes by Public
Employees
1. The Early History ofPublic-Sector Unions and the Boston Strike
The Boston Police Strike of 1919 had a major influence on the
development of public- sector labor law and labor relations in the U.S. The
first lesson, to many, was that government employees should never be
allowed to strike. Following from that, many argued, given that unions
inevitably struck-for decades, there was no notion of any alternative dispute
resolution procedure-government employees simply should not be allowed
to organize into unions.5 Thus, to understand what is happening today, we
must begin with this event, and its effect on public-sector labor relations
generally.
right to strike under any circumstances; five other states allowed some public employees
to strike under common law. RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 235 (Jack Rabin ed., 3d ed. 2001).
5 I develop this thesis and discuss such attitudes in the first half of the twentieth
century in detail in the first and third chapters of JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE (2004).
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Public workers did not begin to get the formal legal right to bargain
collectively or in most cases even the right to form unions until the 1960s.
Not surprisingly, union density in the public sector was significantly lower
before then. Still, some public workers organized unions as early as the
1830s.6 Indeed, in the early years of the 20th century, public-sector unions
were on the rise. A number of major public-sector unions were formed in the
early 20th century. In 1906, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) created
its first national union of government workers, the National Federation of
Post Office Clerks. In 1902, the Chicago Teachers Federation had affiliated
with the Chicago AFL. In 1916, the AFL formed the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT). In the year before the Boston strike, the AFT grew from
2,000 to 11,000 members. In 1917, the AFL established the National
Federation of Federal Employees. That same year, the National Association
of Letter Carriers, founded in 1889, affiliated with the AFL, as did the
Railway Mail Carriers. The AFL chartered its first firefighters local in 1903
and created the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) in 1918.
The IAFF soon grew from about 5,000 to more than 20,000 members.7
The unionization rate in the public sector reflected this activity. From
1900 to 1905, union density in the public sector was less than 2 percent,
increasing to only around 3.5 percent in 1910. Then from 1915 to 1921, this
density increased from 4.8 to 7.2 percent; in this same period, the total
number of government employees in these years grew from 1,861,000 to
2,397,000. Thus, from 1915 to 1921, the total number of public workers in
unions nearly doubled.8 But the Boston Police Strike cut short this growth.
Significantly, the direct cause of the Boston strike was Boston Police
Commissioner Edwin Curtis banning Boston police officers from joining a
union affiliated with the AFL and suspending officers who refused to leave
the affiliated union. The police officers had sought to be in such a union
because of common complaints: low wages, long hours, and unhealthy
working conditions. 9 Opponents of the unions cited, among other things, the
problems with "divided loyalty" of police officers, specifically the idea that
they would not be neutral in strikes by private sector unions affiliated with
the AFL.]0
The strike, which began on September 9, 1919, had disastrous
consequences. For the three days, crime was rampant in Boston. State guards
6 Id at 16-17.
7 Id at 18.
8Id
9 Id. at 25.
10 Id at 29-30.
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finally intervened-firing into the crowds-killing nine and wounding
twenty-three others. Hundreds more were injured during the strike. Property
damage was estimated in the hundreds of thousands of dollars." With peace
finally restored, all 1,147 strikers were fired and never reinstated.12
The aftermath of the Boston strike significantly damaged public-sector
unionism. All police locals affiliated with the AFL were soon destroyed,
often because they were banned by local governments. While other public-
sector unions tried to avoid association with the Boston disaster by
emphasizing or adopting no-strike policies, many were still devastated. The
IAFF lost fifty locals, including its Boston affiliate. The strike also led to
losses in membership of the AFT and other public-sector unions. Overall,
after years of increases, the rate of unionization in the public sector, which
had bolted up rapidly in the preceding years, now stagnated below the 1921
rate of 7.2 percent through the rest of the 1920s.13
2. The Lasting Impact ofBoston Police Strike
Moreover, for decades policymakers and judges associated all forms of
public-sector unionism with the horror of the Boston strike. All unions of
government employees affiliated with the AFL, and later with the CIO,
renounced the strike weapon, and, from 1920 until the late 1960s, public-
sector unions almost never struck. 14 Still, the image of strikes as the only
method for settling disputes between public employers and unions was
deeply ingrained.
This was especially true of judges. No state statutes gave public-sector
unions any rights until 1959, so public-sector labor law up into the 1960s was
essentially made by judges. And judges insisted that public-sector unions
would resolve impasses just as private sector unions did-by striking.' 5
For example, in 1947, the Missouri Supreme Court, in King v. Priest16
upheld a local government rule banning a local of the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) that more than eight
11 SLATER, supra note 5, at 14-27.
12 Id. at 14.
I3 Id. at 3 6.
14 Id. at 82.
15 I discuss in more detail the cases in this section and related cases in id. at Chapter
3, and in Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know "What a Labor Union is": How
State Structures and Judicial (Mis)Constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79
OR. L. REv. 981 (2000).
16 King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 88, 206 S.W.2d 547, 557 (1947).
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hundred police officers had joined. The union's charter barred striking and
bargaining and stated that the oath that police officers took regarding their
duties came before any obligation to the union. Instead of tactics used in the
private sector, the charter continued, the local would, "by publicity, direct
public attention to conditions that need c.orrecting ... seek legislative action .
. . represent individuals in administrative procedure, and prevent
discriminatory and arbitrary practices."17
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument: "[T]he court, of
course, knows what a labor union is" it explained. The court took judicial
notice of the "common knowledge" that "some of the most common methods
used by labor unions . . . are strikes, threats to strike, [and] collective
bargaining agreements . . . ."18 Indeed, "all of the rights and powers
ordinarily inherent in a labor union would exist actually or potentially" in the
local, "regardless of the form of its charter and the present admissions of
appellants."19
Similarly, Congress of Industrial Organizations v. City of Dallas20
discounted the fact that the constitution and bylaws of the union in question
renounced strikes "or other concerted economic weapons or procedures."21
The court explained that the "declaration of the local to abandon the usual
procedure pursued by labor unions to accomplish their purposes, is in
irreconcilable conflict with the declared purposes and objects of the
unions."22
Again, because judges saw no alternatives to strikes for public-sector
unions, judges also opposed union organizing by government employees,
often using very dramatic language to make their points. Two separate court
decisions in the 1940s, one from Texas and the other New York, used the
following quote: "To tolerate or recognize any combination of. . . employees
of the government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible
with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon
which our Government is founded." 23
17 Id. at 553.
18 Id at 554.
19 Id
20 Cong. of Indus. Org. v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. 1946).
21 Id at 148.
22 Id
23 Id. at 145 (quoting Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (1943)).
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B. The First Public-Sector Labor Law in Wisconsin, and Developing
Alternative Forms ofDispute Resolution in the Public Sector
The first public-sector labor law was passed in Wisconsin in 1959, and
then amended in 1962. Proponents of the law began attempting to pass such a
law in 1951, and did so in every legislative session-which, at that time, was
every other year-until they succeeded. The way in which bargaining
impasse disputes would be resolved was a central issue in debates over the
various bills. Proponents of the law had to overcome various traditional
objections to public- sector unions, one of the most important of which was
the threat of strikes, including but not limited to police strikes. The
Wisconsin law for the first time was a realistic attempt to create alternative
forms of dispute resolution for unions of government employees. 24
In 1951, in Wisconsin, some locals of the AFSCME, a major public-
sector union then and now, introduced a bill. The bill would have given
Wisconsin public employees the right to organize unions and granted some
limited quasi-bargaining rights (dubbed "collective considerations"). As an
alternative to strikes, the bill provided that in cases of bargaining impasses, a
state agency, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (WERB) would
offer conciliation services.25
This was defeated, in large part due to fear of strikes by police and other
government employees. Public employers opposed to the bill stressed the
strike issue. In response, a clause was added to the bill stating explicitly that
strikes were illegal, and proponents of the bill stressed that there had never
been a strike of police or firefighters in Wisconsin, and that such unions
barred strikes in their constitutions. 26
This was not enough for opponents. For example, Oliver Grootemaat,
President of the Village of Whitefish Bay wrote Wisconsin Governor Walter
Kohler Jr., stating that the "mere elimination of one phrase could grant
municipal employees the right to strike." Also, echoing opponents of the
Boston police union, Grootemaat added that allowing police to organize
"might place them in the anomalous position of being called upon to police a
strike called by a brother union." 27 The Wisconsin League of Municipalities,
a group of public employers, opposed the bill. Among other things, they
explicitly cited the Boston police strike. 28 Governor Kohler vetoed the bill.29
24 I discuss the events in Wisconsin in more detail in SLATER, supra note 5 at Ch. 6.
25 SLATER, supra note 5 at 170.
26 Id. at 170-73.
27 Id. at 172.
28 Id. at 172-73.
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AFSCME supported a similar bill in 1953. The bill was held up in
committee, mostly on the strength of Republican votes.30 In 1955, AFSCME
tried again, this time with a bill that excluded police. But the Republican-
controlled Senate rejected the bill. Proponents of the bill were only able to
get an agreement that a Legislative Council would study the matter.
Ultimately, the study suggested keeping the status quo: rejecting a call by
some to ban public- sector unions, but giving no more rights to unions.31 In
1957, a bill to give public-sector unions organizing and limited bargaining
rights was tabled on a seventeen-fifteen vote, with all seventeen votes against
the bill coming from Republicans. 32 In a quote that could have come from
2011, AFSCME blamed "this Chamber of Commerce dominated
legislature." 33
The political environment changed after the 1958 elections. For the first
time in decades, Wisconsin elected a Democratic Governor, Gaylord Nelson,
and a Democratic State Assembly. Nelson was friendly toward unions. He
had even worked for a time representing AFSCME in Wisconsin. 34
AFSCME introduced another bill in 1959. It again contained the right to
organize. It specified that when bargaining reached impasse, WERB would
have the power to mediate and conduct voluntary arbitrations. A lengthy
struggle ensued, with a modified version of the bill becoming law. 35
During debates on the bill, AFSCME stressed the need for tools such as
arbitration and mediation to resolve disputes. "Any law which would prohibit
strikes without providing other means of settlement is not fair. A union must
have a way of getting its grievances and requests acted upon," AFSCME
leaders argued. 36
The fact that the bill was enacted into law showed the growing political
clout of public- sector unions, and evolving attitudes toward them. But
showing how difficult charting a new path for public-sector labor would be,
the section authorizing the WERB to aid in bargaining impasses was
dropped.37
29 Id. at 173.
30 Id at 173-74.
31 SLATER, supra note 5, at 174-78.
32 Id at 178.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 179.
35 Id. at 181.
36 SLATER, supra note 5, at 181.
37 Id at 182-83.
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Governor Nelson signed the bill into law on September 2, 1959. For the
first time, most employees of county and municipal government in
Wisconsin had a statutory right to organize and be represented by unions in
negotiations over wages, hours, and working conditions. The law excluded
public safety workers and state employees. 38
The law led to many new agreements between AFSCME and other
public-sector unions and local governments in Wisconsin. But it was still
unclear what, exactly, should happen when bargaining came to an impasse,
and AFSCME expressed dissatisfaction with the law in that regard.39 At the
same time, unions faced counterattacks. In 1960, the Republican candidate
for governor, Philip Kuehn, called for a ban on public-sector bargaining and
even on organizing. Echoing old arguments, Kuehn insisted that there could
be no right to bargain with the government because there was no right to
strike against the government.40
In a sense, both Kuehn and AFSCME were wrestling with the same
issue, an issue that has existed in public-sector labor law from the first laws
through today: what should happen in government employment when union
bargaining reaches impasse? Kuehn believed that with no right to strike,
bargaining was meaningless, so, why have a right to bargain? AFSCME was
frustrated by a law that authorized "negotiations" but provided no method to
resolve bargaining impasses and wanted more procedures to provide an
alternative to strikes.4 1
Democrat Nelson won a second term as governor in 1960, although the
Republicans retook the State Assembly and kept a majority in the Senate.42
In 1961, AFSCME introduced a bill to amend the 1959 law such that at
impasse, either party could ask the WERB for a fact-finder.43 As discussed
below, fact-finding is now common in public-sector labor laws, including
Ohio's law. Typically, fact-finders find facts relevant to the bargaining
impasse and offer recommendations. 44 Also, under the 1961 Wisconsin bill,
WERB officials could act as mediators or arbitrators. Participation in
arbitration would be voluntary, but decisions would be binding.45
38 Id. at 183.
39 Id. at 184-85.
40 Id. at 185.
41 Idat 185-86.
42 SLATER, supra note 5, at 186.
43 Id. at 186.
44 See infra, Section III-B-2.
45 SLATER, supra note 5, at 186.
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The Bill was then amended to make arbitrations only advisory, not
binding, and to allow fact-finding only when both parties-as opposed to
either-wanted it. Thus, the law as enacted in January 1962 provided for
WERB mediation if both parties requested it, and advisory fact-finding, if
both parties requested it.46
In later years, the law was amended to provide for, among other things,
binding interest arbitration to settle bargaining impasses. A separate statute
was passed to give similar rights to employees of Wisconsin's state
government. A later amendment even permitted strikes, albeit in very limited
circumstances. 47 The Wisconsin law also sparked a national trend. By 1966,
sixteen states had enacted laws granting some organizing and bargaining
rights to at least some public employees. 48 By the year 2000, twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia allowed collective bargaining for all
major groups of public employees; thirteen states allowed only one to four
types of public workers to bargain (most commonly teachers and
firefighters); and eight did not allow any public workers to bargain. 49
Still, battles over the very idea of collective bargaining in government
employment continued, most dramatically in 2011, but also in earlier years. 50
Specifically as to impasse resolution, even after unions began winning the
rights to organize and bargain, the right to strike remained highly
controversial and infrequently allowed. 51 None of the early public-sector
labor statutes passed in the 1960s permitted strikes. By the year 2000, barely
a dozen states allowed any public workers to strike (and some employees,
such as police and fire, may not strike legally anywhere in the U.S.). 52 On the
other hand, thirty-eight states provided some alternative procedures to
resolve bargaining impasses: thirty-six states used mandatory or optional
mediation; thirty-four used fact-finding; and thirty had arbitration as the final
46 The law now also covered police and fire, and explicitly provided for written
contracts. Id. at 186-87.
47 See generally William C. Houlihan, "Interest Arbitration and Municipal
Employee Bargaining: The Wisconsin Experience," in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES 84 (Joyce M. Najita & James L.
Stern, eds. 2001).
48 SLATER, supra note 5, at 191.
49 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 60-61.
50 See Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law, supra note 1, at
149-53 ("Recent decades have seen major swings in the pendulum concerning public
employee collective bargaining rights.").
51 See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES, & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 555-90 (2d ed. 2010).
52 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 236-37.
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step.53 Further, even the minority of states that permit some public
employees to strike often allow strikes only after unions and employers have
completed a number of mandatory alternative impasse resolution procedures,
e.g., mediation and fact-finding. 54
Arguments against allowing public-sector strikes remain influential.
Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter, in their book The Unions and the Cities,
argued that if public workers were allowed to strike, government officials
would give in to union demands because strikes would burden the public and
thus undermine the officials' chances for reelection.55 Other traditional
objections to public-sector strike rights include claims that such strikes
threaten the provision of vital government services (some of which are
essentially monopolies), undermine government sovereignty, give employees
excessive bargaining power, and also that public employers often lack the
ability to change conditions of work set by the legislature. 56 Also, the specter
of the Boston police strike continues to play a role. 57
C. Non-Delegation and Arbitration
With regard to alternative dispute resolution, one other issue from the
"pre-collective bargaining" era before the 1960s is worth mentioning.
Various courts in this era held that grievance arbitration and other aspects of
collective bargaining in the public sector violated the constitutional non-
delegation doctrine.58 The basic principle of this somewhat obscure doctrine
53 Id. at 235-37, 264-65.
54 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §4117.14 (West 2012) (requiring unions that are
permitted to strike to go through, among other things, mediation and fact-finding before
striking); see generally MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 51, 597-610.
55 HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER JR., THE UNIONS AND THE
CITIES 29-32 (1971). Experience has shown that this is not always the case; indeed,
public-sector strikes are often unpopular. Thus, the incentives for politicians often may not
be what Wellington and Winter feared. See Craig A. Olson, "Dispute Resolution in the
Public Sector," in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 162 (Benjamin Aaron, Joyce M. Najita &
James L. Stem eds., 2d ed. 1988).
56 See B.V.H. Schneider, "Public-Sector Labor Legislation-An Evolutionary
Analysis," supra, 202; Kurt L. Hanslowe and John L Acierno, The Law and Theory of
Strikes by GovernmentEmployees, 67 CORNELL L.REv. 1055,1060-66 (1982).
57 See NORMA M. RICCUCI, ET AL., PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT:
POLITICS AND PROCESS, 477 (6th ed. 2007) (although "many years have elapsed"
between the Boston police strike and the present, "the basic problems involved are
essentially the same and remain without substantial resolution.").
58 SLATER, supra note 5, at 77-81.
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is that the government has certain powers that it may not constitutionally
delegate to private bodies. 59
Before the 1960s, courts often held that two types of union activities
were improper delegations of power if they took place in the public sector.
First, collective bargaining, because it delegated power over terms of
employment to a private party, the union.60 Second, and more relevant here,
courts into the 1960s held that the non-delegation doctrine barred both
interest arbitration and grievance arbitration in public-sector labor relations, 61
as it improperly gave private arbitrators power over non-delegable decisions
regarding government employment.62 Even today, while the vast majority of
jurisdictions have rejected this approach, some courts have upheld anti-
delegation objections to public-sector interest arbitration. 63
III. MODERN LAW
A. Legal Strikes as the Minority Approach
The era from the 1960s to the present saw the development and
maturation of a variety of mechanisms to resolve bargaining impasses in the
public sector. Most jurisdictions use some combination of mediation, fact-
finding, and binding interest arbitration. 64 Ohio allows many public
employees to strike, 65 but, as note 2 mentions above, that is the minority
approach.
Interestingly, it appears that effective collective bargaining laws tend to
reduce the number of strikes by government employees-even when the law
makes such strikes legal. In Ohio, as Professor Martin Malin has shown,
making public-sector strikes legal actually greatly reduced the number of
59 Id
60 Note that this makes bargaining illegal even if the public employer agrees to
bargain. SLATER, supra note 5, at 77 (citing Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 44 A.2d 745
(Md. 1945) and Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d (1946)). See id. at 78-
80, for a critique of these holdings.
61 Grievance arbitration is the enforcement of terms of union contracts, generally
by labor arbitrators. It has long been established in private-sector labor relations.
62 See Karen Speiser, Labor Arbitration in Public Agencies: An Unconstitutional
Delegation of Power or the "Waking of a Sleeping Giant"?, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 333,
337, 339-41 (1993).
63 See Section III-B-4, infra.
64 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER,supra note 51, at 611-67.
65 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14(D)(2) (West 2012).
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such strikes. 66 The Ohio public-sector labor law authorizing collective
bargaining and strikes for most covered employees took effect on April 1,
1984, and after the law became effective, in the eight years from April 1,
1984 through April 30, 1992, there were 110 public-sector strikes in Ohio,
seven of which were illegal.67 In contrast, in the years before the law was
passed, from 1974-1979 (a shorter time period), there was a total of 282
strikes, all illegal. 68 This effect continued in later years in Ohio, and has been
seen elsewhere. From 1993-99, there were only fifty public-sector strikes in
Ohio. From 2000-2010, there were only forty-three public-sector strikes.69
More broadly, one study found that strikes were most likely to occur in states
without a bargaining law and least likely to occur in states with a bargaining
law that provided for binding arbitration. 70
B. Alternative Impasse Resolution Procedures
1. Overview and Mediation
Still, only a minority of states permits public employees to strike and
thus the majority of states relies on alternative dispute resolution processes.
The main alternatives for dealing with bargaining impasses are mediation,
fact-finding, or interest arbitration. In many jurisdictions, some or all of these
procedures are mandatory when the parties are at impasse, and in many
jurisdictions (although not all) interest arbitration results in a binding
contract.7 ' Even where some public employees may legally strike, they often
must go through mediation or fact-finding before striking.72
66 Martin Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 361-65 (1993).
67 Id
68 Id.
69 Philip Stephens, "Benefits of Bargaining: How Public Sector Negotiations
Improve Ohio Communities," POLICY MATTERS OHIO, 8 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.policymattersohio.org/BenefitsofBargaining.htm.
70 David Lewin et al., Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
from Research on Public-Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining 2, 13-14 (Emp't
Policy Research Network, Labor and Emp't Relations Ass'n Working Paper Series, 2011),
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1792942.
71 MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, supra note 51, at 611-
77.
72 Id at 597-601. See, e.g., Ohio's statute, requiring both mediation and fact-finding
before a union is permitted to strike. OHIO REv. CODE §4117.14.
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Mediation involves a third party with no power to impose a contract
meeting with the parties to try to work out a voluntary agreement. Mediators
are sometimes private parties but more often come from state agencies.
Approximately thirty-seven states use mediation for at least some public-
sector impasses. In many jurisdictions, either party may invoke mediation; in
some, both must request it; and in some, the state labor agency can trigger
mediation on its own initiative.73
2. Fact-Finding
Thirty-three states use fact-finding for at least some public-sector
impasses.74 Fact-finding uses an outside, neutral party, who typically does an
investigation, often including a hearing with formal presentations from both
sides.75 Fact-finders usually issue reports, which often include non-binding
recommendations. 76 Also, fact-finder reports are often used as evidence in
interest arbitrations. 77
Public-sector labor statutes typically provide criteria for fact-finders to
use when issuing their recommendations. For example, the Iowa Code
provides:
Section 20.22(9). Binding arbitration.
The panel of arbitrators shall consider, in addition to any other relevant
factors, the following factors:
a. Past collective bargaining contracts between the parties including the
bargaining that led up to such contracts.
b. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
involved public employees with those of other public employees doing
comparable work, giving consideration to factors peculiar to the area and
the classifications involved.
73 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 263-65. For a discussion of some mediation
techniques, see Harold Newman, "Mediation and Fact-Finding" LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: REDEFINING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 180-86 (John
Bonner ed., 1999).
74 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 264-65.
75 MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, supra, note 51, at 614-
15. See generally Newman, supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 Id
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c. The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public
employer to finance economic adjustments and the effect of such
adjustments on the normal standard of services.
d. The power of the public employer to levy taxes and appropriate
funds for the conduct of its operations. 78
Fact-finding can give the parties a more realistic assessment of their
positions, or at least their chances of prevailing at arbitration. Also, making
fact-finder reports public (which typically happens if the parties reject the
fact-finder's recommendations) can bring additional pressure on one or both
sides to be more reasonable. 79 On the other hand, fact-finding typically is not
binding. Thus, it lacks finality, and on its own does not provide much
leverage.80
3. Interest Arbitration
a. Types ofArbitration
Approximately thirty states use binding interest arbitration as the final
step in public- sector impasse resolutions for at least some public employees.
In this system a neutral arbitrator (sometimes a board of neutrals) holds a
hearing, evaluates evidence, follows sometimes quite specific legal rules, and
makes a binding decision as to what the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement will be. The arbitrator may be a private party selected by the
employer and union, or be appointed by the state agency. A typical interest
arbitration hearing involves some witness testimony (for substantive and
political reasons), but most of the evidence is usually documentary (e.g.,
information about the employer's budget and about the compensation of
"comparable" employees). 81
Significant variations exist within this type of process, however. First, in
"conventional" interest arbitration, the arbitrator may pick among the offers
of the parties, but the arbitrator may also come up with "compromise"
78 IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22(9) (West 2010).
79 For example, the Ohio statute provides that the fact-finder's report is private,
unless and until the parties reject the fact-finder's recommendations and move on to
further stages in the impasse resolution process. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14(C)(6)(a)
(West 2012). At that point, the fact-finder's decision is publicized. The point, of course,
is to allow the parties to try to use political pressure to encourage a settlement.
80 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 272-73; Newman, supra note 75, at 189-190.
81 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 262, 264-65, 274-75.
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solutions. So, for example, if the union proposal at impasse is $15 per hour
and the employer's proposal is $13 per hour, the arbitrator could choose $13,
$15, a number in between (e.g., $14), or, at least in theory, other numbers.
An alternative approach is "final offer" arbitration, in which the arbitrator
can only pick the final offer of one side or another.82 "Final offer"
arbitration, in turn, comes in two varieties: "issue-by-issue" and "total
package." 83 In issue-by-issue arbitration, for each issue at impasse, the
arbitrator must choose the final offer of one party or the other.84 Suppose, for
example, two issues were at impasse. First, wages: the union proposes $15
per hour, and the employer proposes $13 per hour. Second, a work rules
issue: the union proposes that a certain task may only be done by two
employees working together; the employer rejects that proposal entirely. In
"issue by issue" final offer arbitration, the employer could choose the
employer's offers on both issues, the union's offers on both issues, or the
employer's offer on one issue and the union's offer on the other issue. In
"total package" final offer arbitration, however, the arbitrator could choose
only both the union's proposals or both the employer's proposals. 85
Some states use different types of arbitration for different types of
employees, or "mix and match" models, (e.g., final offer arbitration for
economic issues but not for others). 86 Other variations exist. In Ohio (for
employees not allowed to strike), the default is final offer issue-by- issue
arbitration, but the parties can choose other alternatives, including but not
limited to conventional arbitration and final offer total package arbitration.87
Arbitrators often express frustration with "final offer" rules, which may
not be surprising since it limits their discretion. For example, in a fairly
recent arbitration involving Helena, Montana and its firefighters' union,
Arbitrator Jeffrey Jacobs opined:
82 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 14, 643-44; Arvid Anderson and
Loren Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
153 (1987).
83 Id
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Anderson & Krause, supra note 82, at 157-58 ("Michigan's police and
firefighters statute, for example, provides for final offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue
basis on economic issues and for conventional arbitration on non-economic issues ....
New Jersey's law embodies yet another variation, requiring the arbitrator to choose either
the employer's or the union's last offer as a total economic package, but allowing the
arbitrator to resolve non-economic issues on a final offer, issue-by-issue basis. . .
87 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.14(C)(1), (D)(1), and (G)(7) (West 2012).
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This is a total offer final package arbitration. The arbitrator must
therefore select either the City's or the Union's total package. This
limitation makes it difficult on occasion to select between positions as there
are many times when one party's position is reasonable and justifiable in
one respect while in some others another party's position may well also
have considerable merit. When that is the case, as here, there is a temptation
to find a figure somewhere in the middle [of] the two respective positions
that reflects the relative merits of both parties' arguments.
With this type of interest arbitration however that option does not exist.
The arbitrator must therefore select the most reasonable and justifiable
position as a total package . . . . [A] total offer final package arbitration of
this nature removes any power to modify or fine tune either side's position
or to fashion an award that reflects the best of both arguments or conforms
to the most appropriate evidence brought forth by either side. For better or
worse, the arbitrator must select the least unreasonable option.8 8
On the other hand, a traditional argument against conventional arbitration
is that it discourages realistic, hard bargaining because the parties expect the
arbitrator to "split the baby"; thus, both sides have an incentive to cling to
relatively extreme proposals. 8 9 Some studies conclude, however, that
arbitrators do not simply split the difference in the most conventional interest
arbitrations. 90
One might ask here, what is the ultimate goal of this alternative dispute
resolution mechanism? A Delaware case, distinguishing interest arbitration
from grievance arbitration, explained:
Arbitration of contract terms differs radically from arbitration of
grievances. The latter calls for a judicial determination of existing contract
rights; the former calls for a determination, upon consideration of policy,
fairness and expediency, of what the contract rights ought to be. In
submitting this case to arbitration, the parties have merely extended their
88 City of Helena, Mont. v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 448, BOPA CASE #
5-2010 (407-2010, April 19, 2010).
89 See, e.g., Frederic Champlin and Mario Bognanno, "Chilling" Under Arbitration
and Mixed Strike-Arbitration Regimes, 6 J. LAB. RES. 375, 376, 383-386 (1985); James
Chelius and Marian Extejt, The Narcotic Effect of Impasse-Resolution Procedures, 38
INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 629, 630 (1985).
90 See, e.g., Henry Farber, Splitting-the-Diference in Interest Arbitration, 35 INDus.
&LAB. REL. REV. 70, 76 (1981).
402
[Vol. 28:2 2013]
INTEREST ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
negotiations-they have left it to [the arbitrator] to determine what they
should, by negotiation, have agreed upon.91
A Michigan case similarly stated that the role of interest arbitration is "to
effect the settlement the parties would have reached if negotiations had
continued when the parties are confronted with the realities of the situation,"
i.e. "to try to replicate the settlement the parties themselves would have
reached had their negotiations been successful." 92
These are interesting, if not entirely convincing, ideas. Of course the
existence of impasse likely means the parties had a different view of what
they "should have" agreed on and what a "successful" outcome would be.
And how could one determine what settlement the parties "would have"
reached without considering the pressures the particular impasse resolution
mechanism would put on the parties during negotiation?
b. Statutory Criteria Arbitrators Must Consider
Statutes providing for interest arbitration also generally give the
arbitrators criteria which they must consider. For example, Ohio's statute
provides that interest arbitrators (and fact- finders) must consider the
following:
(a) Past collectively bargained agreements, if any, between the parties;
(b) Comparison of the issues submitted to final offer settlement relative
to the employees in the bargaining unit involved with those issues related to
other public and private employees doing comparable work, giving
consideration to factors peculiar to the area and classification involved;
(c) The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public
employer to finance and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of
the adjustments on the normal standard of public service;
(d) The lawful authority of the public employer;
91 Del. State Troopers Ass'n v. State of Del., Dep't of Safety and Homeland Sec'y,
Div. of Police, BIA 08-02-612 at 4252 (Del. Pub. Empl. Rel. Bd., June 1, 2009) (quoting
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 1358-59 (Alan Ruben
ed., 6th ed. 2003)).
92 City of Taylor v. The Command Officers' Ass'n of Mich., MERC Case No.
D06CO326 at 5 (Jan. 30, 2008) (quoting Cnty. of Ottawa's Sheriffs Dep't v. Police
Officers' Ass'n of Mich., MERC Case No. L96-H-6011 (1998)).
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(e) The stipulations of the parties;
(f) Such other factors, not confined to those listed in this section, which
are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
the issues submitted to final offer settlement through voluntary collective
bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, or other impasse resolution procedures
in the public service or in private employment.93
The statutes of other states generally try to get at similar concerns.
Montana Statutes provide:
(5) In arriving at a determination, the arbitrator shall consider any
relevant circumstances, including:
(a) comparison of hours, wages, and conditions of employment of the
employees involved with employees performing similar services and with
other services generally;
(b) the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
public employer to pay;
(c) appropriate cost-of-living indices;
(d) any other factors traditionally considered in the determination of
hours, wages, and conditions of employment.94
Statues typical list the criteria that interest arbitrators must consider,
often using fairly detailed language, e.g., not just listing the employer's
"ability to pay," but also specifying which types of comparable employees,
cost of living numbers, and financial data from the employer the arbitrator
should consider.95
Some statutes specifically instruct arbitrators to give certain criteria the
most weight. For example, Oregon's statute states that the "first priority" is
the "interest and welfare of the public." 96 The Oregon statute also gives
comparatively specific guidance on determining who are "comparable"
employees (an issue discussed in more detail in the following subsection):
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14(G)(7) (West 2012).
94 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-103 (West 2009).
95 KEARNEY, supra note 4 at 275.
96 OR. REv. STAT. § 243.746 (West 2012).
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Arbitrators shall base their findings and opinions on these criteria
giving first priority to paragraph (a) of this subsection and secondary
priority to paragraphs (b) to (h) of this subsection as follows:
(a) The interest and welfare of the public.
(b) The reasonable financial ability of the unit of government to meet
the costs of the proposed contract giving due consideration and weight to
the other services, provided by, and other priorities of, the unit of
government as determined by the governing body. A reasonable operating
reserve against future contingencies, which does not include funds in
contemplation of settlement of the labor dispute, shall not be considered as
available toward a settlement.
(c) The ability of the unit of government to attract and retain qualified
personnel at the wage and benefit levels provided.
(d) The overall compensation presently received by the employees,
including direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other paid
excused time, pensions, insurance, benefits, and all other direct. or indirect
monetary benefits received.
(e) Comparison of the overall compensation of other employees
performing similar services with the same or other employees in
comparable communities. As used in this paragraph, "comparable" is
limited to communities of the same or nearest population range within
Oregon. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the following
additional definitions of "comparable" apply in the situations described as
follows:
(A) For any city with a population of more than 325,000, "comparable"
includes comparison to out-of-state cities of the same or similar size;
(B) For counties with a population of more than 400,000, "comparable"
includes comparison to out-of-state counties of the same or similar size; and
(C) For the State of Oregon, "comparable" includes comparison to
other states. (f) The CPI-All Cities Index, commonly known as the cost of
living.
(g) The stipulations of the parties.
(h) Such other factors, consistent with paragraphs (a) to (g) of this
subsection as are traditionally taken into consideration in the determination
of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. However,
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the arbitrator shall not use such other factors, if in the judgment of the
arbitrator, the factors in paragraphs (a) to (g) of this subsection provide
sufficient evidence for an award.97
The most important factors are, at least often, "comparable" employees
and the ability of the employer to pay.
c. "Comparables"
Interest arbitrators consider two kinds of "comparables": external and
internal. External comparables are employees of other public employers who
do work that is the same or very similar to the work of the employees in the
arbitration. For municipal employees, this usually means employees of other
cities of a similar size, often within the same state. "Internal" comparables
involve arguably similar employees of the same employer. This issue is often
labeled "internal consistency." For example, in a police arbitration,
arbitrators can look to wages, hours, and working conditions of firefighters in
the same city, or employees of the police department who are not in the
union bargaining unit. Some cases stress external comparables over internal
comparables, while other cases stress internal comparables over external
comparables. 98
Because comparables are such a significant factor, many interest
arbitrations spend a good deal of time debating which other employers and
employees are proper comparisons. In a case arising in Michigan, the
arbitration panel explained:
Act 312 and the rules governing the Act do not prescribe specific
factors the panel must consider when determining comparability. Generally,
factors commonly considered include size of the community to be served,
form of government, SEV and taxing authority, tax effort and other
economic factors, scope of duties, the location of the comparable
97 OR. REv. STAT. § 243.746 (West 2012).
98 Compare, e.g., Vill. of Lisle, Illinois and Metropolitan Alliance of Police, FMCS
No. 100511-02194-A (2011) (Arbitrator Ann Kenis stressing external comparables
in selecting the Union's final offer), with Dakota County (Minnesota) and Teamsters
Local No. 320,129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1285 (2011) (Arbitrator Jeffrey Jacobs stressing
internal comparables in awarding the County employer's offer).
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communities as they relate to the local labor market and population
demographics ... .99
Also, even after determining which employees are comparable, the parties
may still disagree on how exactly to compare, e.g., compensation. 00
One goal of looking at "comparable" employees is to determine what the
"market" is for certain types of public work. Another goal involves
recruitment and retention. In City of Helena, the arbitrator warned of "some
danger" if comparable jurisdictions gave significant wage increases to their
comparable employees in 2010 and Helena did not. Helena's wages "will
eventually fall too far behind if the City's proposal is awarded and that is a
major concern." The potential danger was not abstract unfairness to Helena's
employees. Rather, it was that Helena would be unable to recruit and retain
good employees if nearby, comparable cities were paying noticeably higher
wages for basically the same jobs. 0' For that reason, some arbitrators stress
geographic proximity as an important factor in determining comparability. In
a case arising in Washington state, Arbitrator Amedeo Greco noted that "[i]t
may be interesting in the abstract to know what police officers make in
Cheney; but what a Kelso officer could make by driving to Centralia or
Battle Ground is much more personal data." 02
Debates over comparables can be complicated. As noted above,
Oregon's statute gives comparatively specific guidance on how comparables
should be determined (mainly, cities in Oregon within specified population
ranges). Still, one decision in an Oregon case devoted twenty-eight pages
solely to the issue of which cities are comparable to Roseburg, Oregon
regarding firefighters.103
d. The Employer's Ability to Pay
Most statutes require arbitrators to consider the employer's ability to pay.
Not surprisingly, in interest arbitrations, employers rarely maintain they are
99 White Lake Towp. and Police Officers Labor Council, Mich. Emp. Rel. Comm.,
Case No. D06 G-1698 (2008).
100 For example, in City of Helena, supra, the parties disagreed about whether to
use mean or median average wages, and whether to use hourly as opposed to monthly
wages.
101 City of Helena, supra note 88.
102 Fircrest Police Officers Guild and City of Fircrest, WA, PERC Case 21294-
1-07-500 (2008) (Greco, Arb.).
103 City of Roseburg, Oregon and Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1110, Case No.
IA-09-06 (2007) (Cavanaugh, Arb.).
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affluent. But the recession that began in 2008 made this a central factor in
interest arbitrations across the country. For example, in a case arising in
Illinois, Arbitrator Edward Benn wrote the following:
During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings . . . the economy
went into free-fall....
First, on the initial day of hearing on August 5, 2008, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average ("DJI") was at 11,616.14. On the second day of hearing
on September 5, 2008, the DJI was at 11,221.... On January 26, 2009 -
the trading day before the issuance of this award - the DJI stood at 8116,
still 30% down from the commencement of these proceedings....
Second, contemporaneous with the dramatic fall in the stock market
and since the close of the hearing on September 5, 2008, credit markets
have frozen up, companies have gone out of business or cut back
operations, massive layoffs have occurred and government bailouts of
staggering proportions have been announced in an effort to get the economy
moving....
As bad as the national unemployment rate is, the State's unemployment
picture is worse. . . . These are the worst unemployment rates in Illinois
since June 1993. ...
For the Union, the above described economic events could not have
come at a worse time. . . . Section 14(h)(7) provides that interest arbitrators
consider "[c]hanges in any of the foregoing circumstances during the
pendency of the arbitration proceedings." Given the crash of the economy
described above which occurred while this case was being presented, to say
that "[c]hanges . . . during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings"
occurred in this case would be an understatement.
Further, Section 14(h)(5) provides that cost-of-living be considered.
Given the declining cost-of-living numbers, that factor does not favor the
higher rank differential sought by the Union. 1 04
Most arbitrators have taken a similar approach. A decision from
Washington state explained, "in the current tough economic times the State's
408
104 State of Illinois, Dept. of Cent. Mgmt. Serv. and Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 726, Case Nos.: S-MA-08-262, Arb. Ref. 08.208 (2009) (Benn, Arb.).
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ability to pay trumps all of the other statutory factors."105 Similarly, in a case
from Minnesota, Arbitrator Mario Bognanno wrote:
Minnesota's general economic conditions have deteriorated sharply
since CY 2007. For this reason, the wage and insurance terms that the
instant parties might have voluntarily negotiated under the prevailing
economic and fiscal regime most likely would have been different from
those that were negotiated by comparable external bargaining units during
better times-2007. Accordingly, the Arbitrator is not inclined to rely on
the "dated" negotiated settlements of comparable external bargaining
units-a conclusion that is strongly attenuated by the Employer's
increasingly strained ability-to-pay.1 06
e. The Significance ofPrecedent
Interest arbitrators often take seriously past arbitration decisions
involving the same or similar employees and past arbitral interpretations of
statutory language. As to statutory language, in City of Roseburg, Oregon,
Arbitrator Cavanaugh explained,
I believe it promotes stability in public employee bargaining for an
arbitrator to follow the decisions of prior arbitrators, and a party asking for
a deviation from established interpretations of the law carries a heavy
burden. That is so, in my view, even if I might have decided the issue
differently as a matter of first impression. Not that slavish devotion to
precedent is required. If I were convinced that my fellow arbitrators had
utterly misread the statute, I might be willing to strike out on my own in a
different direction now.1 07
Arbitrators also follow precedent when the issue involves a contract term
that was interpreted in an earlier interest arbitration. For example, in City of
Alton, IL and IAFF Local 1255,108 the union asked for an expansion of a
residency requirement, despite having lost on that same issue in a 2005
arbitration with a different arbitrator. Arbitrator John Fletcher rejected this,
stressing the importance of precedent.
105 State of Washington and SEIU Local 775 NW (supplemental interest award)
(2009) (Williams, Arb.).
106 The Metro. Council, Metro Transit Police Dept. and Law Enforcement Labor
Serv., Inc., Local 203 -Police Admin. & Command Employees, BMS Case No. 08-PN-
1141 (2009) (Bognanno, Arb.).
107 City ofRoseburg, supra note 103.
108 Ill. Lab. Rel. Bd. No. S-MA-006 (2007) (Fletcher, Arb.).
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[T]he Union's case ... is a trip down memory lane. While this was not
automatically fatal . . . the Union was nevertheless subject to a higher
burden of proof in light of Arbitrator Meyers' conclusions a mere two years
ago.... Arbitrator Meyers' award should be given deference equal to that
of a negotiated status quo. . . . [P]utting the parties back to ground zero ...
would be tantamount to rendering the entire purpose of interest arbitration
useless. ... [It] would promote a practice of "arbitrator shopping" until the
party petitioning for departure from the status quo was finally satisfied with
the outcome, after which the "loser" could do the same. Clearly, this
practice was never contemplated under the Act, given the final and binding
nature of arbitration and statutory guidance as to how the arbitrator should
reasonably (if not always absolutely perfectly) discern what the "natural
extension of the bargaining process" should produce.
Indeed, most interest arbitration awards are closely linked to previous
contracts between the parties. Barring changes in the law or significant
changes in circumstances, arbitrators often require a significant quid pro quo
for any substantial departure from previous contracts. 10 9
4. Impasse Procedures Without Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
The principle behind mandatory, binding interest arbitration is that it is
the quid pro quo for being denied the right to strike. For example, in Snyder
County Prison Board and County of Snyder v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board and Teamsters Local 764, the court explained that
"[b]ecause of the need to have prison guards on duty, the legislature has
denied prison guards the right to strike. . . . The quid pro quo for such an
arrangement is the provision of mandatory mediation and interest
arbitration. . . ." The legislature intended "to balance the bargaining
positions of public employers and public employees who are not permitted
to strike." 110
In a minority of jurisdictions, however, interest arbitrators issue opinions
that are merely advisory rather than binding. The obvious criticism is that
109 This has prompted one commentator to suggest that the process "could probably
be accomplished more inexpensively by averaging the parties' final offers and adding on
some noise using a computer's random number generator." David E. Bloom, "Arbitrator
Behavior in Public Sector Wage Disputes," in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS
UNIONIZE, 123 (Freeman & Ichniowski eds., 1988).
110 Snyder County Prison Bd. And County of Snyder v. Penn. Lab. Rel. Bd., 912
A.2d 356, 367 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2006).
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this sort of arbitration gives unions no more leverage than a fact-finder's
recommendations: the employer still has final discretion. In another approach
used by a few jurisdictions, both parties must agree to use a binding process.
Also, a minority of states (e.g., Florida) which authorize collective
bargaining but prohibit strikes simply have no step after mediation or fact-
finding.11' And some states have binding, mandatory arbitration for some
public employees, but not others. For example, Michigan uses binding
arbitration for certain public safety workers, but not for other public
employees.1 12
Some jurisdictions lack binding interest arbitration because of non-
delegation concerns. Again, before the 1960s, courts routinely held that
grievance arbitration and indeed collective bargaining itself in the public
sector violated constitutional nondelegation rules, but most jurisdictions later
abandoned that approach. By the mid-1980s, courts in fourteen states had
rejected claims that mandatory binding arbitration rules violated the
nondelegation doctrine, and courts in only three states had held mandatory
binding arbitration unconstitutional.11 3 By the 1990s, sixteen states had
rejected nondelegation claims.1 14 Among other grounds, courts held that a
public employer's rights are protected by its statutory right to appeal any
arbitration award.115 Still, five states had upheld such challenges: South
Dakota, Colorado, Utah, Nebraska, and Maryland.11 6 In some cases, courts
struck down statutes because they failed to provide enough criteria for
arbitrators to base awards.11 7 The most recent case striking down binding
interest arbitration on nondelegation grounds was County of Riverside v.
Superior Court.118 While important to public employees in California, this
case relied on fairly specific language in the California state constitution, and
it did not mark a shift in the majority approach.
I See KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 273-74.
112 Compare MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.231-33 (West 2012) (compulsory and
binding arbitration for police and fire employees) and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
423.271-87 (West 2012) (same for state police troopers and sergeants) with MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.207-207(a) (West 2012) (mediation is the final step for all other public
employees, and if mediation fails, the employer can implement its final offer).
113 See Schneider, supra note 56, at 208 and nn. 69-70 (collecting cases).
114 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 279.
115 See, e.g., Office of Administration v. Penn. Lab. Rel. Bd., 528 Pa. 472, 479
(1991).
116 KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 278.
117 Rehmus, Interest Arbitration in BONNER, ED., supra note 73, at 198.
118 Cnty. of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d 718, 722 (Cal. 2003).
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5. Judicial Review ofInterest Arbitration Decisions
Public-sector labor statutes generally permit the parties to appeal the
decisions of interest arbitrators to court. For example, a court may overturn
an arbitrator's award if the arbitrator did not properly consider the factors
that the relevant public-sector statute says the arbitrator must consider. What
if an arbitrator sincerely believes a statutory factor is not applicable in a
given case? Courts, and individual judges on courts, differ as to the extent to
which arbitrators have to explain why they feel a factor is not applicable. For
example, In re Buffalo Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Inc., Local 282,
IAFF1l9 featured a split on this issue. The majority reversed a lower court's
decision that vacated an arbitration award. The lower court had held that the
arbitrator gave inadequate consideration to various statutory factors. On
appeal, the majority disagreed:
Certainly, the Legislature could have chosen language that would
require public arbitration panels to make express findings with respect to
each of the statutory factors, or even each factor put in issue by the parties,
but it did not. Thus, the Legislature has not required arbitration panels to
engage in unnecessary discussion in their awards of factors not raised by the
parties or thought to be relevant by either the parties or the panel. Judicial
review of public arbitration awards otherwise would devolve into mere
mechanical checklists, despite the fact that an award may appear on its face
to be reasonable and to have a rational basis. 120
The dissent, however, would have upheld the lower court:
Civil Service Law §209 (4) (c) (v), the statute at issue herein, is clear
and unambiguous. It provides that "the public arbitration panel shall make a
just and reasonable determination of the matters in dispute. In arriving at
such determination, the panel shall specify the basis for its findings, taking
into consideration, in addition to any other relevant factors, the following ...
In our view, the plain language of the statute requires an arbitration
panel to do more than merely parrot that language by reporting in a
conclusory fashion that it took into consideration the four enumerated
factors. Indeed, the Legislature carefully crafted the language of the statute
by stating that "the panel shall make a just and reasonable determination of
the matters in dispute," thus rendering mandatory the arbitration panel's
119 In re Buffalo Prof 1 Firefighters Ass'n, Inc., Local 282, N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App.
Div., 2008).
120 Id. at 749.
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consideration of the four enumerated factors, and compliance with the
statute is lacking in the absence of specific discussion of those factors... .121
The competing policy concerns here involve, on the one hand, a desire
that arbitration decisions at least normally be final, and the belief that
arbitrators should not waste time discussing matters that are not germane to
the case before them. On the other hand, public-sector interest arbitration is
in some ways different from private-sector grievance arbitration, where
courts are extremely deferential. 122 The public does have an interest in at
least some terms of public-sector labor contracts, and public-sector labor
statutes do direct arbitrators to consider certain factors.
Courts will also vacate interest arbitration awards if they violate other
statutory requirements. Arbitrators cannot issue awards on matters not
properly before them (e.g., issues not raised properly in the bargaining
process or issues that are permissive or illegal topics of bargaining).
Arbitrators must also follow rules designating the type of arbitration to be
used. For example, McFaul v. UA WRegion 2123 vacated an arbitration award
because the arbitrator "split the baby" instead of choosing the final offer of
one side, as the default process in Ohio's statute required.124
IV. ATTACKS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE PROCESSES IN THE 2011 LAWS
In 2011, around a dozen states passed laws limiting public-sector
bargaining rights in various ways, including but not limited to eliminating the
right entirely for some employees, greatly limiting the scope of bargaining,
and mandating "right to work" rules (which make illegal any contractual
agreement obligating members of a union bargaining union to pay their fair
share of representation costs). I and others have discussed these changes in
detail elsewhere.125 This section focuses on changes that these new laws
made to rules governing the resolution of bargaining impasses.
First, as mentioned above, Ohio law permits most public-sector
employees to strike (after going through mediation and fact-finding); those
121 Id. at 750.
122 See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960) and its progeny.
123 McFaul v. UAW Region 2, 719 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
124 The union's final offer was a 5 percent raise; the employer offered 3 percent,
and the arbitrator ordered 4.2 percent. Id. at 633-35.
125 For descriptions of these new laws, see Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of
Obama, supra note I at 203-12; Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor
Law: A Search for Common Elements, supra note 1 at 150.
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who cannot strike (mostly, but not exclusively, police and fire employees)
have a right to binding interest arbitration.126 Ohio Bill SB-5, signed into law
but later repealed by a voter referendum,127 would have radically revised this
processs.
Instead of the right to strike or the right to binding interest arbitration,
under SB-5, when bargaining reached impasse, the parties would only have
non-binding mediation and fact-finding available. If that did not produce an
agreement-and the fact-finder's report could have been rejected by either a
majority of the employer or a majority of the union-then the governing
legislative body (often the employer itself) would have had the option of
choosing the employer's final offer.128 And even within the fact-finding
process, SB-5 would have required that, in determining the employer's
"ability to pay" (a statutory factor fact-finders had to consider under pre-
existing law as well), the financial status of the public employer at the time
of negotiations could be considered; future potential revenue increases from
levies and bonds could not be considered.129 Also, SB-5 would have added a
rule that, for many employers (not the state or state universities), if the
relevant legislative body selected the last best offer that cost more, and the
CFO of the legislative body did not determine whether sufficient funds
existed to cover the contract, the last best offers could have been submitted to
the voters. 130 Finally, under pre-existing law, unions and employers could,
through mutual agreement, choose alternative procedures to help resolve
bargaining impasses. Under SB-5, unions and employers would not have had
such options.13 1
In short, SB-5 would have created a form of "bargaining" in which one
party (the employer) could have unilaterally chosen its own offer and the
other party (the union) would have had no further recourse under the law.
With neither binding interest arbitration nor the right to strike, unions would
have had little to no leverage in negotiations, arguably ending their right to
engage in truly meaningful and productive collective bargaining.
While SB-5 did not become law, other states actually did gut their
impasse procedures. Under rules that had been in effect for decades before
2011, Wisconsin employees had broad rights to binding interest
126 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §4117.14 (West 2012).
127 See generally, Joseph Slater, The Rise and Fall of SB-5 in Political and
Historical Context" 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 473 (2012).
128 Ohio Senate Bill 5 (2011) amending OHIO REv. CODE §4117.14.
129 Id., amending § 4117.14(D)(2).
130 Id., amending OHIO REv. CODE §§ 4117.14(D)(2), 4117.141.
131 OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14(C) (West, 2012).
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arbitration. 132 The "Budget Repair Bill," Wisconsin Act 10 (2011), §234,
bars interest arbitration for all public employees Act 10 covers. Interestingly,
this does not apply to certain public safety employees who are generally
excluded from the new Act's provisions.133 For the many employees Act 10
covers, the Act does not provide a specific replacement procedure to resolve
bargaining impasses.134
Idaho enacted SB 1108, which limits collective bargaining by teachers.
Section 22 of this law eliminated mandatory fact-finding. Now only
mediation remains, and even this is limited. Under §20 of the new law, if the
parties reach impasse in bargaining, they are permitted-but not required-to
enter into mediation. Section 20 further provides that if the parties have not
reached an agreement by June 10 of the year of the negotiations, the school
board will unilaterally set the terms of employment for the coming school
year.135
In Illinois, SB 7 amended the state's Educational Labor Relations Act to
(among other things) place significant restrictions on the right of Chicago
Public Schools employees to strike. Under §13(b)(2.10) of this law, for
Chicago schools, if mediation fails to produce an agreement after a
reasonable period of time, either party has a right to fact-finding. If this does
not produce a settlement, the parties have up to fifteen days to accept or
reject the fact-finder's recommendations. If the recommendations are
rejected, then they are made public. The union cannot strike for until thirty
days after the publication of the recommendations and even then cannot
strike unless at least 75 percent of the bargaining unit authorizes the strike.136
In Nebraska, Legis. Bill 397 changed the state's interest arbitration rules
to be more favorable to public employers. Notably, in Nebraska, interest
arbitration is performed by the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR)
rather than by private arbitrators. The new Nebraska law provides detailed,
and more restrictive (and employer-friendly) criteria for selecting the group
of "comparable" communities for interest arbitrations. Also, it mandates that
if the employer pays compensation between 98 and 102 percent of the
average of the comparables, then the CIR must leave compensation as it is. If
the employer's compensation is below 98 percent of the average, then the
132 Houlihan, supra note 47 at 69.
133 Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F.Supp.2d 856 (W.D. 2012)
(Discussing this exclusion).
134 Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law, supra note I at
160.
13 5 S.B. 1108 §§ 20, 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011).
136 S.B. 7, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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CIR must order it raised to 98 percent, and if it is above 102 percent, the CIR
must order it lowered to 102 percent. The targets are reduced to 95-100
percent during periods of recession (defined as two consecutive quarters in
which the state's net sales and use taxes, and individual and corporate
income tax receipts, are below those of the prior year).137
In late December 2010, New Jersey adopted New Jersey Laws 2010, ch.
105. This law capped wage increases at 2 percent for New Jersey police and
firefighter arbitration awards for contracts expiring between Jan. 1, 2011 and
April 1, 2014. This cap on base salaries expires on April 1, 2014.138
Further, this law placed serious restrictions on interest arbitrators.
Arbitrators will now be randomly selected (as opposed to the previous
process of mutual selection); arbitrator compensation is limited to $1,000 per
day and $7,500 per case; arbitrators must issue awards within forty-five days
of a request for interest arbitration (prior law allowed 120 days); and
arbitrators will be penalized $1,000 per day for failing to issue an award.
Also, the arbitrator's award may be appealed to the state public employment
agency, the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), and PERC
must decide the appeal within 30 days. 139
Tennessee, in the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act
of 2011,140 repealed the Educational Professional Negotiations Act, a 1974
law which had authorized collective bargaining for public school teachers
and had featured conventional interest arbitration. Under the new Act,
teachers are now permitted only "collaborative conferencing": the employer
will meet with any group that receives support from at least 15 percent of the
relevant employees.141 Further, §49-5-609(d) of the Act states that the parties
are not required to reach agreement on any of these issues, and adds that if no
agreement is reached, the school board will set terms and conditions of
employment through school board policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Interest arbitration, although not without its flaws and critics, has
generally operated as a fair and ieasonable alternative mechanism for
resolving bargaining impasses. For example, historically, for firefighter and
137 L.B. 397, 102d Leg. (Neb. 2011).
138 2010 N.J. Laws ch. 105.
139 2010 N.J. Laws ch. 105; see Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector
Law, supra note 1 at 161-62.
140 TENN. PUB. CH. No. 378.
141 Id. at §§ 49-5-605(b)(1), (2) & (4).
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police union negotiations in Ohio that have reached impasse and required
arbitration, arbitrators have sided with management about half the time and
unions the other half. Further, the system works by encouraging the parties to
resolve their differences short of arbitration. Only about 2 percent of all
negotiations among those employees in Ohio have gone to arbitration since
1983, and that is likely at least in large part due to the fact that the existence
of this mechanism creates incentives for both sides to be serious and realistic
in negotiations.142 Also, studies show that using binding arbitration to resolve
impasses significantly lowers the probability of strikes. 143
My co-author, Marty Malin, will be arguing in these pages that some
types of interest arbitration are better than others, and that allowing strikes
may sometimes be preferable to interest arbitration.144 My points are perhaps
more obvious: interest arbitration, as described above and as practiced in the
real world, is much better than what came before it in the period up to the
mid-1960s, and interest arbitration is preferable to the alternatives offered in
the 2011 laws.
142 Philip Stephens, "Benefits of Bargaining: How Public Sector Negotiations
Improve Ohio Communities," Policy Matters Ohio (Oct. 2011),
http://www.policymattersohio.org/BenefitsofBargaining.htm.
143 Rehmus, supra note 73, at 202; Olson, Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector,
in AARON, NAJITA & STERN, supra note 55, at 165; KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 277
(collecting sources); see also Thomas Kochan, David Lipsky, Mary Newhart, & Alan
Benson, The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case of New York State's
Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 565, 569 (2010) (study of effect of mandatory,
binding arbitration on police and fire employees shows that as to the "primary purpose...
to avoid work stoppages by essential public service employees, the arbitration statute has
clearly met its objectives: no police or firefighter unit has engaged in a strike" in the
thirty years the study covers).
144 Martin Malin, Two Models of Interest Arbitration, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 145 (2012).
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